A B S T R A C T S

I defend a kind of perspectival pluralism as the best account of the integration of experimental results in neurobiology. I develop this view in response to Sullivan's (2009) critique of ruthless reduction and mechanistic integration as accounts of the unity of neuroscience. Sullivan shows that the two accounts of the unity of neurobiology are no better than their predecessor. She argues that their prerequisite convergence and integration of experimental results are not achievable given the multiplicity of experimental protocols that characterizes contemporary neurobiology. I then propose an elaboration on Sullivan's suggestion that pluralism rather than unification characterizes contemporary neurobiology which goes against SullivanÕs (2007) prescription for increasing the complexity of neurobiological experimental designs. I defend a perspectival pluralism in experimental neurobiology which supports the desirability of the existing multiplicity of experimental protocols and simplicity of experimental situations. Finally, I provide examples of neurobiological practice that support my proposal.

In this paper, I examine Quine's views on the epistemology of logic. According to Quine's influential holistic account, logic is central in the "web of belief" that comprises our overall theory of the world. Because of this, revisions to logic would have devastating systematic consequences, and this explains why we are loath to make such revisions. In §1, I clarify this idea and thereby show that Quine actually takes the web of belief to have asymmetrical systematic structure. However, this raises a new puzzle. As I show in 2, QuineÕs mature thoroughly naturalized view has it that logic is simply obvious, and this is explains why we do not typically consider revising it. While Quine presents this naturalized view as a way to make good on his earlier metaphor of centrality in a web of belief, I argue that the resources of Quine's naturalized epistemology cannot adequately explain why we are reluctant to revise logic. And, Quine seems to recognize this point himself. In light of this, I explain in §3 how Quine can allow that our overall scientific theory has systematic structure in a way that is consistent with his naturalistic strictures.

We provide a derivation of the Born Rule in the context of the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics. Our argument is based on the idea of self-locating uncertainty: in the period between the wave function branching via decoherence and an observer registering the outcome of the measurement, that observer can know the state of the universe precisely without knowing which branch they are on. We show that there is a uniquely rational way to apportion credence in such cases, which leads directly to the Born Rule.

This paper aims to explore the versatility of PopperÕs theory of three worlds in the analysis of issues related to the ontological status and character of artifacts or to use PopperÕs words Ôfeats of engineeringÕ. Although his pluralistic thesis been subjected to critical discussion over years his key perspectives on the reality, (partial) autonomy, and ontological status of artifacts are rarely taken into consideration. This paper intends to address this oversight and has two sections. The first section consists of an exposition of PopperÕs account of reality and (partial) autonomy of artifacts. It aims to measure his contribution to the philosophical study of artifacts. In the second section two arguments are posed to criticize the Popperian proposal of dual ontological status of ÔembodiedÕ World 3 objects, i.e., artifacts. The first argument examines the composition of artifacts and the second one focuses on their creative and epistemic value.

When considering persons, one must consider the criteria for re-identifying a person over time. In the context of the metaphysical picture implied by Everettian quantum mechanics [EQM] - one that includes some type of branching structure to the world - problems of diachronic identity arise. The problem with which I am concerned is a Ship of Theseus-type problem, and I will argue that an answer to the question "With whom will I be identical post-branching?'" can be found in analogy with a solution proposed by Derek Parfit in his 1971, "Personal Identity." I will propose that we use a notion of branch-relative identity instead of the traditional equivalence relation of identity to solve this problem. But first it will behoove us to consider the basic concepts of [EQM] in order to understand the strong physical justification for using the branching metaphysics that gives rise to the problem at hand.

I argue for explaining the correlations observed in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type experiments in terms of (nonlocal) common causes. The first part of my argument seeks to counter the widespread view that the search for causal explanations should be abandoned in the context of EPR-type phenomena. The second part argues that recent Bell-type experiments (together with some metaphysical considerations) favor (nonlocal) common cause models over other types of causal models which could account for the correlations. Finally, the third part of my argument sketches characterizations of the common cause in the context of two different approaches to quantum mechanics, namely the matter-density version of the GRW theory and Bohmian mechanics.

In a recent paper, Jonathan Birch sets out to determine whether inclusive fitness theory has the resources to explain the so-called 'fraternal transitions' from single to multi-cellular life, and solitary to eusocial lifestyles. He begins by outlining a series of obstacles which make it difficult to apply the theory to these episodes in a straight-forward manner, and then introduces a four-part mechanism which is intended to explain how inclusive fitness benefits, in conjunction with a coercive regime that punishes defectors, can overcome these impediments, and effect multicellularity and eusociality. Although worthy of discussion, Birch's thoughts on the origin of multicellular life are not treated in this paper. My sole objective is to determine whether the mechanism he identifies suffices as an account of the eusocial transition. I highlight two general difficulties with Birch's hypothesis which seem to call its validity into question. First, he incorrectly assumes that a mechanism capable of giving rise to eusociality in the Hymenoptera can be cited as an explanans of eusociality in all species. Second, the mechanism Birch posits presupposes the existence of high levels of sociality, and thus fails to provide insight into the transition it is intended to explain.

Scientific realists are committed to the claim that scientific discourse should be interpreted realistically, so that theoretical terms are understood as putatively referring expressions that have putative reference to empirical entities. In order to argue against realistic interpretation, I draw on an episode from the history of chemistry. One of the hypothetical entities of late 18th century chemistry was the muriatic radical, a hitherto unknown element that was thought to be a constituent of muriatic acid. I argue that the term "muriatic radical" resists realistic interpretation, and that we should therefore refrain from interpreting discourse concerning hypothetical entities realistically.

This paper resolves a tension in Quine's thought about non-classical logic. Although he is committed to the possibility in principle of empirical evidence leading us to reject a law of classical logic, his discussions of non-classical logics suggest that he doesn't think this could happen in practice. I examine two possible future discoveries in physics, one concerning the limits of physical computability and the other concerning the impossibility of physical discontinuities. I argue that either of these would count as a good reason to stop using full classical logic in the mathematics that we use to construct our physical theories, but that this would not involve the kind of radical disruption to science that Quine is worried about.

The author considers what our arguments should look like if we seek to support the claim that computers avatars have special moral significance in some way. Suppose we deny that the moral problem of virtual rape lies (solely) in concerns about property, speech, harassment or other standard moral concerns. Suppose we think there are things it is worse to do to an avatar than a mere doll or puppet precisely because of the special moral status of the avatars. We might seek to support the claim that: In general, the distinctive role of avatars in our lives confers upon them special moral status that distinguishes them from mere artifacts or mere property. The author argues that the best case for assigning such special moral status to avatars will be grounded in an appeal to ways in which avatars are analogous to our bodies.

The paper examines the interrelationship between mathematics and logic, arguing that a central characteristic of each has an essential role within the other. The first part is a reconstruction of and elaboration on Paul Bernays' argument, that mathematics and logic are based on different directions of abstraction from content, and that mathematics, at its core it is a study of formal structures. It is further argued that the structural aspect of logic puts it under the purview of the mathematical, analogously to how the deductive nature of mathematics puts it under the purview of logic. This is then linked, in the second part, to certain aspects of Gšdel's critique of Carnap's conventionalism, and with Gšdel's latter-day views about two kinds of formality, intensional and extensional (corresponding to logic and mathematics), and the relationship between them.

I argue that Quine's early critique of Carnap's conventionalism is in serious tension with the holism of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," since his critique of conventionalism makes a compelling case for a privileged status either for logic, or for some other principle by means of which to derive consequences. Based on this, I call for a modification of Quinean holism, on grounds internal to Quine's views. The result motivates a rehabilitation of Carnap's notion of framework principles, and a rethinking of logic as a kind of relativised a priori.

Three discussion questions will be proposed for discussion. First, what insights may be drawn from considering the similarities and differences between Poincaré's and Duhem's accounts of "kinds of minds"? Second, given what we now know about cognitive neuroscience, does it make sense to insist upon a sharp division of labor between the philosophy of mathematics, on the one hand, and the psychology of mathematics on the other? Finally, what do recent studies in the natural and social sciences have to contribute to our understanding of the growth of knowledge, in general, and mathematics, in particular?

Physicist Max Tegmark claims that the currently favored cosmological model predicts that we have duplicates, infinitely many in fact, currently living on other planets just like our own throughout the multiverse. He also claims that the lives of these duplicates "will typically begin to differ eventually." such that while you continue reading this paper, one of your duplicates, whose life up until this point has been identical to yours, decides to put it down and walk way. These conclusions are rooted in his claim that "everything that can happen does happen somewhere." In this paper we challenge these conclusions. We argue both that Tegmark's theory does not live up to his own standards for an empirically adequate multiverse theory and that his conclusions depend on a philosophically suspect conflation of physical possibility with epistemic possibility.

We provide a derivation of the Born Rule in the context of the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics. Our argument is based on the idea of self-locating uncertainty: in the period between the wave function branching via decoherence and an observer registering the outcome of the measurement, that observer can know the state of the universe precisely without knowing which branch they are on. We show that there is a uniquely rational way to apportion credence in such cases, which leads directly to the Born Rule.

Many of the positivists held that one of the distinctive features of analytic statements is that they are empty of factual content, or, as they might have put it, such statements are not "about the world." In this paper, I consider an argument that is commonly directed against this claim. The outline of the paper is as follows. First, I present the "Incomprehensibility Argument." which argues not merely that the claim is false, but actually incomprehensible. Second, I cite some key passages from positivists who hold that analytic truths are not about the world, as this proves helpful in understanding why they held this view. Third, I critically evaluate the Incomprehensibility Argument. Examining both the Incomprehensibility Argument (IA) and the views of the positivists, it seems clear that there is reason to believe that a more charitable reading of the positivists' views provides us with interpretations of what they meant by "the world" and "about" that at least should make us question whether IA should be granted any significant force. Further, the chalkboard analogy provides a means for seeing not only the coherence of the claim that analytic truths are not about the world, but perhaps even its plausibility.

In the Scholium to the laws of motion, Newton states that his own rule for composing motions is very similar to the one used by Galileo. It is commonly stressed that one element of continuity between Galilean and Newtonian approaches to mechanics is the fact that they both provided a mathematical approach to composing motions. In my paper, I delineate the different roles of mathematics in (i) individuating motions and (ii) composing them. I argue that two different conceptions of applied mathematics emerge from a comparison of Galileo's and Newton's rule for composing motions.

WAITING ...

ABSTRACT

Physicist Max Tegmark claims that the currently favored cosmological model predicts that we have duplicates, infinitely many in fact, currently living on other planets just like our own throughout the multiverse. He also claims that the lives of these duplicates "will typically begin to differ eventually." such that while you continue reading this paper, one of your duplicates, whose life up until this point has been identical to yours, decides to put it down and walk way. These conclusions are rooted in his claim that "everything that can happen does happen somewhere." In this paper we challenge these conclusions. We argue both that Tegmark's theory does not live up to his own standards for an empirically adequate multiverse theory and that his conclusions depend on a philosophically suspect conflation of physical possibility with epistemic possibility.